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DEFINITENESS OF CHARITABLE PURPOSE IN MISSOURI
There is a much quoted maxim in the law of charitable trusts
that "charity begins where certainty of beneficiaries ends."1
This statement is affected with elements of confusion unless the
chameleon word "beneficiaries" is properly understood. In the
sense that the ultimate individual recipients of the charity, John
Doe or Richard Roe, must be uncertain, the maxim is substan-
tially true, for certainty of these beneficiaries would import a
private trust, with a consequent loss of the favorable status en-
joyed by a charitable trust.2 If, on the other hand, the word
"beneficiaries" is construed to mean the general object or class
of persons to be benefited, the maxim will not stand. Here there
must be some certainty and definiteness. Thus a distinction is
drawn between the individual recipient and the class of reci-
pients; the former must be uncertain, the latter certain. Al-
though it is an interesting question as to how certain individual
beneficiaries of charitable trusts may be,3 the problem here con-
sidered is, how uncertain may be the general object or class of
beneficiaries in Missouri.
The principles which are supposed to lead to its solution are
simple, so far as Missouri and the great majority of states are
concerned. The trust must be declared with enough certainty
and definiteness to enable the courts, on application of the attor-
ney general who commonly represents the cestuis of a charitable
trust, to (a) recognize the existence of a charitable intent and
(b) understand the limitations placed upon the trustee's discre-
tion in order to be able to restrain him within those limits.4 If
the court deems the language of the instrument inadequate to
enable it to make either of the above findings, the trust will fail
as a charity. These principles, applied to a given instrument,
permit great elasticity; and the decision arrived at will depend
on the individual court's willingness to don judicial spectacles
and peer into the settlor's intent.
It is important at the outset to appreciate that some states for
many years did not recognize charitable trusts as a class, treat-
ing them like any private trust.5 Because of the influence their
1. Stinson, Modern Charitable Trusts and the Law (1932) 17 ST. Louis
LAW Rvmw 307.
2. Bogert, Trusts and Trustees (1935) 1089, Sec. 361.
3. Ibid. at 1093, Sec. 362.
4. Irwin v. Swinney (D. C. W. D. Mo. 1930) 44 F. (2d) 172, 178.
5. A named or ascertainable beneficiary must be evident, and all the
requirements of the rule against perpetuities must be complied with.
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decisions have apparently exerted upon some Missouri decisions,
it is not inappropriate to investigate their positions briefly.
Three states6 very clearly repealed the English Statute of Chari-
table Uses,7 raising the question whether charitable trust had any
existence separate from the statute. The Supreme Court of the
United States first answered this question in the negative,s and
these states adopted the rule9 and reaffirmed it,1o even after the
Supreme Court had changed its mind." Statutes relieved the
unfortunate situation by degrees until at present it is believed
that for all practical purposes the charitable trust is recognized
in these states." A similarly unfavorable environment was fur-
nished charitable trusts in four other states," although by a
somewhat different process of statutes and judicial decisions.
The repeal of the English Statute of Charitable Uses was fol-
lowed by statutes abolishing all trusts except those saved and
enumerated, and omitting reference to charitable trusts. After
a hard fight they were included under the statute, 4 and it was
not until the people of New York had lost the Tilden estate-
that a statute16 was passed reestablishing in substance the En-
glish law of charitable trusts. The states which had followed
New York into her embarrassment followed her out.'7
6. Virginia, West Virginia, and Maryland.
7. 43 Eliz. ch. 4 (1601), which enumerated the purposes generally con-
sidered in England to be charitable and set up machinery based upon the
established church in order to rectify the abuses at that time attending
charities.
8. Philadelphia Baptist Ass'n v. Hart (1819) 4 Wheat. 1, 4 L. ed. 499.
9. Gallego's Ex'rs v. Att'y Gen. (1832) 30 Va. 450, 24 Am. Dec. 650;
American Bible Society v. Pendleton (1873) 7 W. Va. 79; Dashiell v. Att'y
Gen. (1822) 5 H. and J. (Md.) 392, 9 Am. Dec. 572.
10. Fifield v. Van Wyck's Ex'r (1897) 94 Va. 557, 275 S. E. 446, 64 Am.
St. Rep. 745.
11. Vidal v. Girard's Ex'rs (1844) 2 How. 127, 11 L. ed. 205.
12. 2 Bogert, Trusts and Trustees (1935) 1018, sec. 322 and footnotes;
Note (1931) 17 Va. L. Rev. 302; Howard, Charitable Trusts in Maryland
(1937) 1 Maryland Law Rev. 105.
13. New York, Minnesota, Michigan, Wisconsin.
14. 2 Bogert, Trusts and Trustees (1935) 1025, sec. 322; Dwan, Min-
nesota's Statute of Charitable Trusts (1929-30) 14 Minn. L. Rev. 587; Fow-
ler, Charitable Uses in New York (1902) 2 Col. L. Rev. 10; Jollman, The
Development of the Charity Doctrine in Wisconsin (1921) 1 Wis. L. Rev.
129; Holmes v. Mead (1873) 52 N. Y. 332.
15. Tilden v. Green (1891) 130 N. Y. 29, 28 N. E. 880, 27 Am. St. Rep.
487.
16. N. Y. Laws (1893) ch. 701, construed in Allen v. Stevens (1899) 161
N. Y. 122, 55 N. E. 568.
17. Mich. Comp. Laws (1929) sees. 13512-13521, construed in Scudder v.
Security Trust Co. (1927) 238 Mich. 318, 213 N. W. 131; Minn. Laws (1927)
ch. 180; Wis. Stat. (1931) sec. 231. 11 (6, 7) construed in In re Monaghan's
Will (1929) 199 Wis. 273, 226 N. W. 306.
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Missouri was spared these difficulties. The first and perhaps
best reasoned case on charitable trusts in this state18 held that
the English statute was in force and also that charitable uses
were not dependent upon the statute. The court recognized that
an opposite view was taken in some states, but explained that
cases from these jurisdictions were of no persuasive influence
in Missouri.-9 This fundamental difference between states which
recognize charitable trusts and those which do not has not
always been observed by our courts, as will be noted later.
To return to the problem of certainty, it is submitted that
instruments purporting to set up charitable trusts may be
roughly categorized, according to the definiteness of their pro-
visions, into three groups. Thus, one may convey his property
(a) in trust for charity generally, or (b) in trust for religion or
for education, thus naming a sub-class of charity, or (c) in trust
for education, as above, but with a further restriction of use,
either as to the group to receive the benefits, e. g., negro chil-
dren, or the way it is to be applied, e. g., the construction of a
school house, or both. It is apparent that the above provisions
are progressively more definite and certain as one reads from (a)
through (c) and logically one might perhaps expect that any
trusts which fail for vagueness would be of group (a) or (b).
I
In this section an effort has been made to collect the Missouri
cases the language of whose provisions qualifies them to be
listed under group (c) above. First, there is the group where
the restriction limits the gifts to a specified class of beneficiaries.
Thih type is well illustrated by an instrument which put the
property in trust "for the use of worn-out preachers in M. E.
Church in North Mo. Conference.1''2 Certainly it would be diffi-
cult to argue that a charitable intent could not be found or that
the trustee had unbridled discretion, and the court properly
upheld the trust, although condemning in dicta a conveyance
in trust for charity generally.
An important case upheld a provision which left property
to the City of St. Louis in trust "to furnish relief to all poor
emigrants and travelers coming to St. Louis on their way, bona
fide, to settle in the west."2' 1 Those seeking to avoid the trust
manifested great concern lest the trustee be unable to apply
18. Chambers v. St. Louis (1860) 29 Mo. 543.
19. St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Little (1928) 320 Mo. 1058, 10 S. W.
(2d) 47,
20. Buckley v. Monck (Mo. 1916) 187 S. W. 31.
21. Chambers v. City of St. Louis (1860) 29 Mo. 543.
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such ambiguous phrases as "poor emigrants and travelers,"
"bona fide," and "settle in the west." The court did not share
their concern and allowed the trust to stand. A conveyance in
trust "to be spent on the welfare of poor, homeless children, '22
and one "to the Macon County, Mo., school funds, '23 interpreted
as a charitable conveyance in trust to the custodian of the school
funds for the benefit of those entitled to their use, have similarly
been upheld.
Another type of provision which provides an equal degree
of guidance to the trustee or the court is that where the chari-
table purpose is limited, not by specifying the class which is to
benefit, but by limiting the method in which the funds are
applied to their purpose. This type is illustrated by gifts "to
provide for the use of the public a botanical garden," 24 and
"in trust for the purpose of erecting and maintaining thereon
a hospital for sick and injured persons, without distinction of
creed."2  In each case there was a sufficiently identified sub-
class of charity, i. e., in the first, education of the public, in the
second, the public health, further limited by restrictions as to
how the money was to be expended. It cannot be said that the
trustee's discretion was unconfined. Likewise a provision "for
a home and place for the maintenance and education of poor
children" was upheld.2 6
Two cases falling within this category reached a contrary re-
sult. In the first, a remainder "to the Methodist Episcopal
Church and missionary cause,"2 7 was held void for vagueness,
first, because it was not indicated what creed was to be propa-
gated and second, because, even if the word "for" could be sub-
stituted for the word "and" so as to limit the missionary cause
to that of the Methodist Episcopal Church South,' it would not
be known whether the home missions or foreign missions of
that church were intended to be benefited. Later cases have
endeavored to bring this decision into line by explaining that
had the will been "for missionary cause," "a trustee would have
been named who could determine the missionary recipients. 28
22. St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Little (1928) 320 Mo. 1058, 10 S. W.
(2d) 47.
23. Burrier v. Jones (1936) 338 Mo. 679, 92 S. W. (2d) 885.
24. Lackland v. Walker (1899) 151 Mo. 210, 52 S. W. 414.
25. Buchanan v. Kennard (1911) 234 Mo. 117, 136 S. W. 415.
26. Barkley v. Donnelly (1892) 112 Mo. 561, 19 S. W. 305.
27. Board of Trustees of M. E. Church v. May (1906) 201 Mo. 360, 99
S. W. 1093.
28. Irwin v. Swinney (D. C. W. D. Mo. 1930) 44 F. (2d) 172; St. Louis
Union Trust Co. v. Little (1928) 320 Mo. 1058, 10 S. W. (2d) 47.
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It is submitted that the attempted reconciliation is specious for
two reasons: (a) a trust will not ordinarily fail for want of a
trustee, 29 and (b) even had a trustee been provided, the lan-
guage of the court indicates that failure to designate between
the home and foreign branches of the missionary service would
have been an insurmountable obstacle to the validity of the
trust.30 In support of its decision, the court cited cases from
West Virginia and Wisconsin which, as noted above, have been
specifically held inapplicable in Missouri. The other unorthodox
case involved a devise in trust "to be used for missionary pur-
poses in whatever field he [the trustee] thinks best to use it,
so it is done in the name of my dear Savior and for the salvation
of souls."31 Reciting the true principles involved and admitting
that the terms of the trust limited the class to missionary ser-
vice of the Christian religion, the court nevertheless declared
itself unable to determine whether the testator had in mind
"the Armenian or Calvinistic or if under the more limited classi-
fication * * * the Catholic or Protestant faith, or one of the multi-
form other subdivisions of the followers of Christ." 32 It is sub-
mitted that by either one of two logical constructions this trust
might have been upheld. By leaving his property in trust for
Christianity in general, the testator evidenced a broadminded-
ness far above the numerous divisions of Christian creed which
perplexed the court; or, if it must be presumed that the testator
was sectarian-minded, evidence of his own denomination or faith
should have been available to establish intent. In disregarding
these constructions, the court would appear to have violated the
rule of construction which makes charitable trusts the favorites
of the courts.33 Of the cases cited as requiring the conclusion
reached by the court, several were handed down in states which,
at the time, did not recognize the charitable trust.34
II
A few cases have designated a specific sub-class of charity,
but have not restricted enjoyment of benefits to a limited class
29. In re Rahn's Estate (1927) 316 Mo. 492, 291 S. W. 120, 51 A. L. R.
877; Schmidt v. Hess (1875) 60 Mo. 595.
30. Board of Trustees v. May (1906) 201 Mo. 360, 99 S. W. 1093, 1094.
31. Jones v. 'Patterson (1917) 271 Mo. 1, 195 S. W. 1004.
32. See 271 Mo. at 7.
33. Burrier v. Jones (1936) 338 Mo. 679, 92 S. W. (2d) 885; Buckley v.
Monck (Mo. 1916) 187 S. W. 31; Mott v. Morris (1913) 249 Mo. 137, 155
S. W. 434; Hadley v. Forsee (1907) 203 Mo. 418, 101 S. W. 59, 14 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 49.
34. Tilden v. Green (1891) 130 N. Y. 29, 27 Am. St. 487; Owens v. Mis-
sionary Society (1856) 14 N. Y. 380, 67 Am. Dec. 160; Fifield v. Van Wyck
(1897) 94 Va. 557, 64 Am. St. Rep. 745; Carpenter v. Miller (1869) 3 W. Va.
174, 100 Am. Dec. 744.
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or required that the charitable purpose be furthered in a special
way. A provision giving property "to advance the cause of
religion and promote the cause of charity in such manner as my
wife may think will be most conducive to the carrying out of
my wishes '35 was declared inadequate to support a charitable
trust. Subsequent casess6 have limited the scope of the decision
on the theory that the settlor intended to benefit a particular
religion known to the wife, and since she had died, there was
no way of ascertaining his intent. The latter part of the opinion
undoubtedly supports this interpretation. The early part, how-
ever, is placed upon the more general ground that what one
man would consider religion another would believe to be a super-
stition, and since no denomination was specified the trust failed
for vagueness.37 Limited to its facts, this case cannot be counted
out of line. A subsequent case 38 squarely presented the problem
discussed in the dicta of the previous case. Here the property
was conveyed in trust "for the general advancement of Chris-
tianity." The court, with apparent surprise that the point should
be contested, upheld the instrument as a charitable trust.
III
Another group of cases involve provisions that the subject
matter of the trust is to be used for charity as the trustee in
his discretion deems best. It is difficult to imagine an expression
giving the trustee a wider discretion while at the same time
exhibiting the charitable intent which is a sine qua non.
An early case39 was thought to sustain the proposition that
a trust for charity in general was void for vagueness, but sub-
sequent cases have properly limited its effect.40 In that case a
testamentary gift to a trustee "to apply in charity, according
to his best discretion" was coupled with a clear indication in an-
other clause that the testator had explained to the trustee just
how he was to expend the monies. The decision against the trust
was based not on any vagueness of the granting clause but on
the theory that the court, not knowing the nature of the secret
35. Hadley v. Forsee (1907) 203 Mo. 418, 101 S. W. 59, 14 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 49.
36. Irwin v. Swinney (D. C. W. D. Mo. 1930) 44 F. (2d) 172; St. Louis
Union Trust Co. v. Little (1928) 320 Mo. 1058, 10 S. W. (2d) 47; Harger
v. Barrett (1928) 319 Mo. 663, 640, 5 S. W. (2d) 1100.
37. The argument here is similar to that found in Jones v. Patterson
(1917) 271 Mo. 1, 195 S. W. 1004.
38. Sandusky v. Sandusky (1914) 261 Mo. 351, 168 S. W. 1150.
39. Schmucker's Estate v. Reel (1876) 61 Mo. 592.
40. Irwin v. Swinney (D. C. W. D. Mo. 1930) 44 F. (2d) 172; St. Louis
Union Trust Co. v. Little (1928) 320 Mo. 1058, 10 S. W. (2d) 47.
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instructions which had been given the trustee, was unable to
enforce the intent of the settlor.41
Ten years later an instrument instructing the trustee "to
divide said remainder among such charitable institutions of the
City of St. Louis, Missouri, as he shall deem worthy" was held
to provide adequate certainty and definiteness. 2 One sentence in
the decision proved misleading and formed the foundation for
another case four years later. Speaking of an earlier case,'3 the
court said, "There, it is true, a class of persons were selected to
receive aid from the fund; here charitable institutions within a
limited and defined locality are selected.""1 The limitation of
locality thus made was strongly urged in the next case, involving
a conveyance in trust "to such charitable purposes as my said
trustee may deem best," with no mention of locality. 4" The court,
however, declared that failure to limit the locality, which was
the only difference between the two, was of no importance. The
principle of the previous cases was reannounced in dicta a few
years later. 6
Some doubt has been cast on the rule by the latest Missouri
decision in point,'7 where there was a gift of the residue "to such
charitable uses and purposes as he (the executor) may deter-
mine." Both parties to the case were interested in defeating
the trust on the ground of generality and uncertainty, the only
question between them being where the money was to go if
the trust fell. The trust was invalidated, but a subsequent federal
case,'48 interpreting the Missouri law, has sought to weaken the
effect of this holding by pointing out that the public or potential
recipients of the trust were not represented and that the case
for upholding the charity was not before the court. While this
is true, the explanation does not dispose of the adverse holding.
IV
The review of the decisions just concluded does not encourage
deductions and prophecies. The majority of cases uphold the
trusts in all of the three classes; yet others involving all three
either do not, or speak as if they would not, allow the trust to
41. Cf. Hadley v. Forsee (1907) 203 Mo. 418, 101 S. W. 59, 14 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 49.
42. Howe v. Wilson (1886) 91 Mo. 45, 3 S. W. 390, 60 Am. Rep. 226.
43. Chambers v. St. Louis (1860) 29 Mo. 543.
44. Howe v. Wilson (1886) 91 Mo. 45, 3 S. W. 390, 60 Am. Rep. 226.
45. Powell v. Hatch (1890) 100 Mo. 592, 14 S. W. 49.
46. Sappington v. School Fund Trustees (1894) 123 Mo. 32, 27 S. W.
356.
47. Wentura v. Kinnerk (1928) 319 Mo. 1068, 5 S. W. (2d) 66.
48. Irwin v. Swinney (D. C. W. D. Mo. 1930) 44 F. (2d) 172.
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stand. No trend toward the one view or the other is noticeable.
Unquestionably all three types satisfy the requirement that a
charitable intent must be apparent to the court. A trust for
charity generally, which is the least detailed provision of the
three, by the one word "charity" imports the necessary intent.
The requirement that some limitation which the court can under-
stand and enforce must be placed upon the trustee would seem
to be satisfied even by a trust to charity generally. The court
should have no difficulty in determining if the trustee is apply-
ing the money for charity. The common law of charitable trusts
in England and the Statute of Charitable Uses, as well as the
decisions of the Missouri courts, furnish precedents. Certainly
if a trust for "charity" is adequate, a trust for "Christianity"
should suffice, and, if this is so, a trust for "Christian missions"
should not fail. The whole should include its parts. Yet, in the
cases which invalidate a trust for Christian missions, for ex-
ample, there seems to be an insinuation that since the settlor
did not speak in terms of charity generally but limited his con-
veyance to religion and then further to missionary work, he
must also have meant a special kind of missionary work; since
he did not name it, the trust must fall. To state the proposition
is to deny its validity.
Finally, two of the most doubtful holdings find the court citing
decisions from states which, because of their singular doctrines,
should be of no weight in Missouri. If private trust certainty
is the standard by which charitable trusts are to be judged, a
charity has little chance of a long useful life. A clear under-
standing of the reasons for the rule of certainty and an appre-
ciation of the inapplicability of certain foreign authorities is
called for.
BERTRAM W. TREmAYNE.
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